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I. Introduction1
The internet has, in many ways, taken hold of our identities. Google
your name and you will discover-especially if you have an
unconventional name-your internet doppelganger, created by piecing
together fragments of your life: educational history, publications, groups
with which you associate, times for those races you ran, the article you
wrote in college, a New York Times op-ed written on whim, organizations
in which you participated, and, horror of horrors, photographs of youthful
high jinks. The more time we spend on the internet, in fact, the more we
simply exist in this digital age, the more fragments of ourselves will be
online for the world to see. Although some of the material on the internet
could be embarrassing for adults, today's adults only have internet records
dating back about ten years. In contrast, the current generation of teenagers
and children has been using the internet for a longer period of their lives,
creating a much more comprehensive historical record of their identities
that could be damaging to their future reputations. This article identifies
and analyzes the resulting risks and offers regulatory and education-based
solutions to ensure that the future reputations of today's children and
teenagers are protected while still preserving their First Amendment rights
to express themselves freely and their parents' 2 right to guide their
children's upbringing.
Since the colonial era in the United States, and arguably since the
beginning of civilization,3 the welfare of children has generated bitter
conflict between the state and parents. I find that underlying this conflict
are two fundamental questions: (1) who is ultimately responsible for a
child's education, safety, and health and (2) who decides what defines
adequate education, safety, and health. At the heart of the conflict between
parents and the state is the struggle to impart values-whether religious,
historical, or otherwise-to the child. This struggle has played out most
frequently in the contexts of education and social services, where the state
has historically assumed a larger role, but has also arisen in the context of
exposing children to content perceived to be adult in nature.4 In the private
1. I would like to make clear that this article's scope will be narrow-only encompassing
the rights of parents who are deemed fit, where the state traditionally, outside of the educational
context, has much more limited rights.
2. In this article, I use the term "parent" to encompass both parents and legal guardians.
3. See LESLIE J. HARRIS, LEE E. TEITELBAUM, CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND THE LAW
(Wolters Kluwer, 2d ed.) (2006) (discussing Roman law of patria potestas in which the father had
absolute power of life and death over his children and Spartan children, in which children
belonged to the state upon birth).
4. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); cf Am. Amusement Machine Ass'n v.
Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001).
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realm, parents generally have a great deal of discretion in how they choose
to raise their children, which includes exposing their children to whatever
they deem appropriate.5 In certain contexts, the state may step in and
prevent the child from directly accessing the material the state has
classified as inappropriate. However, the Supreme Court said long ago that
the state could not prohibit parents from exposing their children to legal
adult content.t
The dangers of the conventional media addressed in earlier child-harm
jurisprudence, such as violent videogames 7 and print pornography,8 differ
from the harms on the internet, because the former are somewhat bounded
and concrete. Now comfortably ensconced in what many term the "digital
age," this article seeks to reconceptualize the current balance between
parents and the state with respect to children in the context of the internet,
and specifically online social networks. The peculiar harm of online social
networks ("OSNs")-in particular, the potentially uncontrollable
dissemination and long-enduring nature of posted information-is unlike
that of any other medium parents and states have faced in the context of
children. For this reason, the parents' right to freely expose their children
to certain internet content should not be as broad as with exposure to other
legal content. The state and the federal governments should step in to
protect children-via education and regulation-from the harms that
parents, regardless of how attentive, simply cannot anticipate or guard
against.
Part I of this article explores the tension between parents' rights to
expose their children to, and the states' interest in protecting children from,
controversial content. The section begins by surveying the history of
parental rights, which are generally broad in relation to the state, and
addressing the few judicial exceptions made to the typical deference
afforded parents in child-rearing decisions, which fall under what this
author terms the "harm standard." Next, it explores the history of states'
regulation of controversial content for children. The first section concludes
by investigating whether parents should have broad authority in exposing
their children to internet content, or whether the internet presents certain
harms more analogous to cases in which courts have limited parental
authority.
Part II turns the paper's focus to intemet-exacerbated and internet-
created harms. The section begins by briefly exploring the distinction
5. See infra note 9.
6. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639.
7. See Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572.
8. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 631.
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between those harms created by the internet versus those that have always
existed, but which the internet has exacerbated. It next reviews existing
harms facing children and teens, for which the internet has provided
another forum, and also touches upon the benefits of interet use. Finally,
it introduces and discusses the internet-created reputational harm, which is
at the heart of this paper.
Part III explores possible solutions to address the risk of reputational
harm without overly intruding on parental rights or children's First
Amendment rights. This article finds that several types of federal
regulations, buttressed by federally funded state-education programs,
would ameliorate the risks of such reputational harms while respecting
parental rights and children's speech rights.
II. Children and Controversial Content:
Parents Versus The State
A. A Brief History of Parental Rights
The right of parents to raise their child is rooted in several different
theories. 9 The rights have been referred to as those that existed before the
development of the modem state, by virtue of being human.' This
"sacred" right continued to be recognized as modem laws developed, and
governments and courts reaffirmed the interest of parents in the care,
custody, and control of their children.'1 In 1923, a parochial school
teacher, who was teaching German to students, challenged his criminal
conviction under a Nebraska statute prohibiting the teaching of foreign
languages as violating his Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in
9. See TEITELBAUM supra note 3, at 7 (theories include proprietarianism, blood-ties,
interest, and least detrimental alternative) (quoting DAVID ARCHARD, CHILDREN: RIGHTS AND
CHILDHOOD 98 (1993)).
10. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining the origin
of parental rights as being one of the "unalienable rights" protected by the Declaration of
Independence, which though arguably not legally binding, still provides a foundation for our civil
rights jurisprudence); see also Lacher v. Venus, 88 N.W. 613, 617 (Wis. 1922) (describing
parents' rights as "an inherent, natural right, for the protection of which, just as much as for the
protection of the rights of the individual to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, our government
is formed.").
11. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 127 S.Ct. 2618, 2632 (2007) (recognizing one of the most
"sacred duties of parents [as] train[ing] up and qualify[ing] their children for becoming useful and
virtuous members of society .... "); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (reaffirming
parental rights as "perhaps the oldest fundamental liberty interest recognized by [the] [Supreme]
Court"); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923) (recognizing the parents' right to "establish a home and bring up children.").
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employment. 12  The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, but also
addressed, in dicta, the concomitant parental rights at issue, by noting that
the Due Process Clause includes the rights of parents to "establish a home
and bring up children" and "to control the education of their own
[children]."' 3  Two years later, the Court spoke to parental rights again,
albeit circuitously, when several parochial, private, and military schools
challenged an Oregon law requiring public school attendance on Fifth
Amendment takings grounds. 14 The Court once again, in dicta, reiterated
the "Meyer doctrine" that the "liberty of parents and guardians" includes
the right "to direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control."' 5 By 2000, in Troxel v. Granville, the Court surveyed the history
of parental rights and recognized, inaccurately, that the Court had held in
both Meyer and Pierce that parents have a fundamental right to the care,
custody, and control of their children.
16
Nearly a century of cases, beginning with the foundational Meyer and
culminating in Troxel transformed dicta in seriatim, which touched upon
parental rights in various iterations, into an incontrovertible right to raise
one's child in any manner, subject to very few limitations.
B. The State's Interest in Protecting Children
1. The Harm Standard' 
7
Although it has been socially accepted that parents have the primary
role in shaping their children's lives, the state has shared this role for quite
a long time. States have long imposed age restrictions that trump parental
consent governing participation in certain activities, such as, driving
vehicles,' 8 drinking alcohol substances,' 9 and smoking cigarettes.2 ° Such
12. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390.
13. Id. at 399-401.
14. See Pierce, 268 U.S. 510.
15. Id. at 534-35.
16. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65-66; see also id., 530 U.S. at 91-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that there is an unenumerated parental liberty and any claim to it being a fundamental
right does not pass muster in the post-substantive due process era, during which the two major
cases were decided).
17. Throughout this article, I refer to the "harm standard," which is a phrase I use to
describe the standard developed in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) and its progeny
as an exception to the general deference given parents in raising their children.
18. Most states do not let children under the age of sixteen obtain a driver's license, and no
state allows a full license for anyone under age fifteen. See, e.g., California, available at
http://www.dmv.ca.gov/teenweb/dl-btn2/dl.htm.
19. All states have some iteration of laws prohibiting selling, furnishing, or giving alcohol
to minors under the age of twenty-one. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, ch. 562.11 (West
2006); ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, ch. 126 (West 2006).
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regulations were less controversial, because they did not implicate
children's constitutional rights to participate in such activities, but rather
the balance between the state and parents in raising children. The courts,
while recognizing the parent's role, have contemporaneously recognized
that states share authority over children, by upholding, for instance,
compulsory education laws,z1 regulations prohibiting child labor,22 and
regulations prohibiting the sale of adult material to minors.23 Further,
courts empowered states to remove children from parents' authority when
the parents were abusive, neglectful, or otherwise incapable of providing
the child with appropriate care.24 Such authority, which gained potency
post-Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) and the substantive due
process era, was grounded in the states' police powers to provide for the
public health and general welfare and granted states substantial leverage in
the realm of economic and social regulations.25
The common thread, with the exception of the child abuse and neglect
cases, 26 appears to be that all the cases involved situations where the
parents' choices were outside the privacy of their home, triggering the
state's police powers.27 There is, however, something more to allowing the
state to override parental authority. One of the first cases to recognize, at
least implicitly, that the state could override the wishes of citizens-
including parents-in certain situations was Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, in
which the Supreme Court upheld state regulations requiring
immunization. a The case involved an adult who was challenging an
exception to the requirement for children with weak constitutions on equal
protection grounds. 29 The Court emphasized first that children and adults
20. Every state imposes penalties for sale of cigarettes to minors, because of health
concerns. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1555 (1997); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-
35-503, 24-35-506 (2001); see also http://slati.lungusa.org/state-teml.aspid=6 (last visited April
25, 2008, 4:19 pm EST) (shows state survey of smoking prohibitions).
21. See West Virginia Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1942).
22. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412.
23. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. 629.
24. See In re P. Children, 149 N.H. 129 (N.H. 2003) (neglect); In the Interest of C.F., 708
N.W.2d 313 (S.D. 2005) (physical abuse).
25. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
26. As previously noted, this paper will not address situations involving child abuse and
neglect because, given the clearer nature of the harm to the child, questions of state authority are
not quite as murky, or are not murky in the same manner. States are not only empowered to
intrude into family life, they are permitted to drastically change the makeup of the family by
terminating parental rights and placing a child in foster care-whether permanent or temporary.
27. See, e.g., Ginsberg, 390 U.S. 629. Cf Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572.
28. Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
29. Id., 197 U.S. at 14.
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are not similarly situated for the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause,3 °
and further recognized the state's authority, under its police powers, to
mandate such immunizations, presumably irrespective of whether the
child's parent allowed it, for the public health.31
Later, in Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court expressly recognized the
state's authority to act as primary decision-maker for a child, under its
32police powers, if the child was seen to be in harm's way. Prince involved
a Jehovah's Witness who was prosecuted under a Massachusetts law
prohibiting children from selling products-an iteration of the child labor
laws-because she and her niece were distributing free, religious
pamphlets on a weeknight.33 Despite the attenuated connection between
the statute and the child's actions, as well as the weighty nature of the
religious claim at stake, the state's sub rosa concern that the girl would fall
prey to street life convinced the Court to uphold the law.3a The state's
concern that the child might be harmed at some time in the future,
regardless of how conjectural, was held sufficient to justify overriding not
only the parent's liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of her
child, but also religious freedoms associated with the parent's choices.
This deference to the states did not seamlessly translate to the speech
context. The courts have been more reluctant to allow the state to trammel
on First Amendment freedoms, even when the state was attempting to
protect children from controversial content that could harm them.
2. The State's Interest in Shielding Children From Controversial Content
Our country has a long history of the government protecting children
from controversial content,35 running the gamut from materials distributed
by peers in school,36 print materials, 37 audiovisual entertainment, 38 and
30. Id. at 12-14.
31. See Id. at 24-25.
32. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
33. Id.at 159-60.
34. Id.at 170.
35. A precise definition of "controversial" is elusive; however, in this article, it generally
encompasses speech that remains protected by the First Amendment, but that some people find to
be inappropriate for children.
36. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (student-written
articles in school newspaper); Bethel Seh. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (student
government campaign speech).
37. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (books); Ginsberg, 390 U.S. 629
(1968) ("girlie" magazines).
38. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding FCC order
regulating indecent language during radio broadcasts); Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d
134 (1 th Cir. 1992) (finding rap music to be protected speech).
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computers. 39  Because such regulations, despite their special focus on
children, presumptively raise First Amendment issues, the jurisprudence
has been complicated.4° The Court has recognized the need for a state to
demonstrate a compelling governmental interest and a narrowly tailored
regulation; however, it generally avoids any meaningful exploration of the
states' proffered interest. 41 However, in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.
v. FCC, the Court styled a three-part test for regulating speech based on a
proposed interest in protecting children.42 The state must show that (1)
children's social, moral, or emotional development is at stake, (2) that the
speech is the direct cause of the risk, and (3) restricting the speech will in
fact reduce the risk of harm.43 In other words, a state cannot regulate
protected speech for the abstract purpose of protecting children.4 4
States generally offer two justifications for protecting children from
controversial content, to support parents in controlling what their children
are exposed to and an independent interest in development of children.45
With respect to the first interest, parental support, there are frequent
conflicts, because the state and parents do not always have common
interests.46  Thus, supporting parents, per se, cannot be a sufficient
justification unless the state is able to show that the parents actually want
the support, because parents, as noted above, have independent
constitutional rights in guiding their children's development.47
The second justification is an independent interest in the development
of children, which can be further divided into three categories: regulation
of child abuse and neglect, regulation in schools, and the regulation of
juvenile behavior legal for adults. As noted above in Part I.B, the state has
historically had the broadest authority when it comes to physical or
39. See Catherine J. Ross, Anything Goes: Examining the State's Interest in Protecting
Children From Controversial Speech, 53 VAND. L. REv. 427, 439 n.40 (2000) (discussing the
concern surrounding the internet and harms posed to children and states' responses).
40. See Ross supra note 39, at 429-30.
41. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 864 (1997) (overturning the Communications
Decency Act as being overbroad and reiterating that an abstract interest in protecting children
does not, per se, pass constitutional muster First Amendment purposes without analyzing state's
asserted interest). See also Ross supra, note 39, at 430-31 on which this point is grounded.
42. See Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
43. See id.
44. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 217-18 (1975); Interstate Circuit,
Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 686 (1968).
45. See Ross supra note 39 at 435.
46. Id. at 475-76. Professor Ross identifies three categories of families-imperfect
normative family, a nonconformist family, and an idealized normative family-in her article,
which further reinforces the weakness of the states' interest, per se, in supporting parents, which
relies on a false presumption of conformity between state and parental interests.
47. See Ross supra note 39, at 475-76.
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emotional harm to the child.48 Long predating the Prince case, states have
exercised their police powers to remove children from their home for
neglect or abuse. Our country has a long history of states protecting needy
children. 49 In the nineteenth century, private organizations cropped up as
predecessors of foster care to care for children of poor and immigrant
parents. 50 These organizations would investigate reports of child abuse and
neglect, file complaints against perpetrators, and aid courts in prosecution
of complaints-the broad concern was rescuing children from unhealthy
environments. By the early twentieth century, there was an attitude shift
toward assisting parents to care for their children by providing services. 5'
Three federal statutes currently comprise the welfare regime under which
states are required to proceed in order to get federal funding, and serve to
buttress the states' authority in protecting children from abuse and
neglect.
5 2
Public education is another context in which the Court has traditionally
given a great degree of leeway to the states. Many conflicts arise between
parents and the state within the public school context, because all fifty
states have compulsory education laws, requiring attendance at a state-
accredited school or state-approved home-schooling.53 Although a state's
authority is not unlimited,54 it is quite broad. 55 It is well-settled law that
courts will generally defer to state boards of education in their curricular
decisions, very rarely allowing parents' desires to prevail.56 Despite the
48. See Adoption and Safe Families Act (1997), Adoption and Child Welfare Act
("ASWA"), and Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (1974); TEITELBAUM, supra note 3,
at 614 (noting that all states have statutes requiring suspected abuse or neglect to be reported to
the police or to the state child welfare agency); see also supra note 24 and accompanying text.
49. See TEITELBAUM supra note 3, at 629-33.
50. Such concerns were sub rosa in the Prince decision.
51. See White House Conference on Children (1909) ("No child should be removed from
the home unless it is impossible so to construct the family conditions or to build and supplement
the family resources as to make the home safe for the child.").
52. See, e.g., Adoption and Safe Families Act (1997) (Pub. L. 105-89), Adoption Assistance
and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (Pub. L. No. 96-272), and Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101, etseq. (1974).
53. Donya Khalili, Off the Grid: Vaccinations Among Home-Schooled Children, 35 J. L.,
Med. & Ethics 471, 471 (2007).
54. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (striking down a Louisiana law requiring
creation science to be taught whenever a teacher taught evolution as unconstitutional under the
First Amendment).
55. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 260 (holding that the school has the authority to filter content
within a school-sponsored, student-written newspaper so long as legitimately related to
pedagogical concerns); Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (holding that a school board has the right to censor
content deemed inappropriate for the students).
56. See, e.g., Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003). Cf Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972); Barnette, 319 U.S. 624.
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fact that parents are not required to send their child to the state's public
schools, the choice is artificial for many, because obstacles-whether
financial, intellectual, or otherwise-exist to sending their child to private
or parochial schools. It could be argued therefore that the state controls the
children's upbringing during school hours, and the parents must settle for
before and after school. Frequently, though, the line between school and
home is not so easily delineated. Parents must address school issues that
conflict with their child-rearing decisions and schools must likewise
address parental choices that conflict with curricular decisions.57
Finally, states have also tried to regulate juvenile speech that is legal
for adults and falls outside the school and abuse contexts. This article
focuses on this context, because it is very challenging to strike a sensible
balance between parental rights and state interests with respect to
children's exposure to controversial content. It is the area in which the
stricter evidentiary showing required by the Supreme Court's Turner test
comes to the forefront, and the states confront the most protected realm of
parental rights.
An early case tackling children's access to controversial content was
Ginsberg v. New York, where the Supreme Court upheld a New York
statute prohibiting the sale of legal pornography 58 to minors without
parental consent, under the same harm standard developed in the earlier
line of cases. Although the content was protected by the First Amendment
for adults, the Court upheld the legislature's conclusion that it was obscene
as to a child and as such, was outside the First Amendment protections for
children. Thus, the special vulnerability that children possessed allowed a
broader definition of obscenity for children than for adults.59 The Court
further justified its decision by noting that the law did not tread upon
parents' liberties, because it did not prohibit parents from purchasing the
material and giving it to their child.60 The Court carefully delineated the
line between the private and public realm by re-emphasizing the parents'
interest in exposing their child to whatever legal material they choose. 61 It
is only when the state finds a potential harm to the child that parents may
57. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. District, 393 U.S. 503 (1968) (student speech);
Leebaert, 332 F.3d 134 (curricular decisions).
58. In Ginsberg, the legal pornography was not considered obscene as to adults, but rather
encompassed by a new definition of obscenity, which the state legislature crafted for children.
59. Compare Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), with Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641
(noting that "[w]hile supervision of children's reading may best be left to their parents, the
knowledge that parental control or guidance cannot always be provided and society's
transcendent interest in protecting the welfare of children justify reasonable regulation.").
60. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639.
61. Id.
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not be capable of ameliorating, that it may permissibly step in to address
the issue. 62 Moreover, the Court added that that the harm need not be
proven by "scientifically certain criteria," it simply cannot have been
disproven.63
In 2000, Judge Richard Posner in American Amusement Machine Ass 'n
v. Kendrick offered a more standard take on child-harm jurisprudence
involving potentially protected speech by striking down an Indianapolis
ordinance, which prohibited minors from entering into arcades housing
"violent videogames" without parental supervision.64 At the threshold, he
differentiated between the sexual content at issue in Ginsberg, which was
unprotected by the First Amendment, and the violent speech at issue in
Kendrick, which was protected speech and afforded strict scrutiny.6
Although the law was substantially similar in scope and foundation as the
New York statute in Ginsberg, Judge Posner argued that the harm present
in controversial sexual content was much graver than that present in violent
videogames, which explains why the former is not protected by the First
Amendment whereas the latter is. 6 6 He further elaborated by describing our
civilization as having a violent history and expressed concern for shielding
our youth from the realities of the world.67 He argued that exposure is
necessary to gradually acclimate our youth to some of the horrors they will
likely face upon maturation, as opposed to sheltering them until age
eighteen upon which they would be deluged by reality.
68
Thus, the "constitutionally protected" relationship between parent and
child would sometimes have to yield even with respect to speech affecting
religion and matters of conscience.69 Ultimately, although the parents have
the primary responsibility for their child's welfare, parental authority
would always be tempered by the states' authority to regulate the family in
the public interest.70
62. Id.
63. Id. at 642-43.
64. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572.
65. Id., 244 F.3d at 576-77.
66. Compare Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) (holding that violent speech is
protected under the First Amendment) with Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (1973) (defining obscenity as
"works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual
conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value" and holding that it is not protected by the First Amendment).
67. Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 577-79.
68. Id., 244 F.3d at 577.
69. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).
70. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
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3. Children's Constitutional Rights and the Internet
Next, I will examine the history of children's First Amendment rights,
as it provides the closest constitutional analogue to rights attendant to
internet use. It is important to note, however, that the Supreme Court has
considered children's rights in a variety of other settings.71 It was not until
the 1940s, in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, that children
were considered as independent persons by the law, rather than merely an
appendage of their parents, in our federal court system.72 Given the unique
vulnerability of children, however, their rights functioned differently than
those of adults, and as such, states had wider leverage to restrict children's
actions.73  In the 1960s, the Supreme Court began to define the
constitutional rights of children.74 In Application of Gault, the Court held
that a fifteen-year-old boy had access to the same constitutional right as
adults to due process of law in juvenile delinquency proceedings.75 Shortly
thereafter, the Court recognized, in the landmark Tinker case, that children
"do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate" and are
"persons under the Constitution ... possessed of fundamental rights which
the state must respect., 76  That same year, the Court reminded us how
different children's rights are in Ginsberg, which held that a state could
permissibly broaden the definition of obscenity for children and thus
regulate the distribution of certain protected speech.77
Subsequently, children's First Amendment rights were recognized as
reduced in the school context. The Court held in Bethel School District v.
Fraser that public school officials may permissibly censor a student's
speech it deemed inappropriate for the other students, analogizing to the
Ginsberg case. 78  Two years later, in Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier, the Court held that public school officials would not offend the
71. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (unconstitutional to require parental
consent for a minor to obtain an abortion); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (constitutional to
allow parent or guardian to voluntarily commit child without child's consent); Carey v.
Population Sen's. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (minors have right to contraception).
72. See Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
73. See Prince, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944) (recognizing that children have constitutional
rights but they function differently than adults); see also Charlene Simmons, Protecting Children
While Silencing Them: The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act and Children's Free Speech
Rights, 12 Comm. L. & Pol'y 119, 129 (2007).
74. See Simmons, supra note 72.
75. See Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (holding that, under the Constitution, minor has same
access as adults to notice of charges against him, right to counsel, right to confrontation and cross
examination of witnesses, and to privilege against self-incrimination).
76. See Tinker, 393 U.S. 503,505,511 (1968).
77. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
78. See Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
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First Amendment by controlling the style and content of a school-
sponsored, but student-run newspaper, if the restrictions were "reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." 79  The Court recognized,
though, that there is a significant difference between the rights of students
in the classroom and outside of school.80 So, perhaps there would be a
significant difference between a child using the internet at school as
compared to his home.
There have not been many cases relating to children's right to use the
internet, per se. In 2002, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided in JS.
v. Bethlehem School District that a public school could permissibly restrict
a student's internet use, if it had a substantial-enough effect on the school
that it could be considered as being "on-campus" activity.8 1 If other courts
follow Pennsylvania's broad holding, then most children who attend public
schools and use the internet at home to communicate with other students
may already have very limited First Amendment protections. On the other
hand, one could view the current jurisprudence as limiting children's rights
in only specific situations, such as in a school setting or where the state
shows serious harm. As such, the state would not have very much control
over children's internet activities outside school unless the state could show
harm that rose to a high-enough level to override children's First
Amendment rights, whatever those may be.
4. How the Internet has Changed the Landscape
The decision to allow one's children access to the internet is
completely distinct from allowing them to flip through a Playboy, view a
rated 'R' film, or even sample a sip of your Bordeaux in the privacy of
your home. The internet, by its very nature, is public, regardless of
whether the user is actually in the public. In the early stages of the world-
wide-web boom, when individuals referred to "Internet" as though it were
an actual being emanating in the ether, its reach was incomprehensible.
Now, as the internet has become more pedestrian, there is a much clearer
understanding that as you browse your favorite news site, you are
inhabiting, albeit metaphysically, far more than the desk chair situated in
the privacy of your home. You could be in many places simultaneously,
sporadically traversing across the globe with a click of your mouse-as
your internet service provider may be located in another state, the website
79. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
80. Id. at 273.
81. 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002) (holding constitutional a student's suspension for creating a
website on home computer, entitled "Teachers Sux," which he accessed and aimed at the specific
school, because it was considered on-campus where school had wide regulatory leverage).
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could be based on another continent, and its internet service provider in yet
another country.
The internet has become so commonplace that it is no longer limited to
adults; in fact, children use it at least as frequently as adults.82 The
increasing number of children using the internet, often without parental
supervision, has led to burgeoning concerns about the potential harms to
which they were being exposed, especially with regard to sexual content
and privacy violations.83 Thus, as the internet expanded, jurists and
lawyers struggled to apply existing laws, drafted for the physical world, to
the digital world. Existing laws were an imperfect fit, but the harms to
children were immediately apparent. 84 As a result, Congress began drafting
laws in the early stages before it fully understood the internet's labyrinthine
quality.
The internet is largely regulated by the federal government, because of
constitutional restrictions on the role of states.85 Internet activity, as noted
above, is very difficult to pin down to a precise location and much more
often than not spans across multiple locations: intrastate, interstate, and
international. Although states tried to draft laws, the laws did not pass
constitutional muster, because they were generally found to burden
interstate commerce, unless drafted very narrowly. 86 Thus, Congress took
82. Michele J. Fleming, Shane Greentree, Dayna Cocott-Muller, Kristy A. Elias, and Sarah
Morrison, Safety in Cyberspace: Adolescents' Safety and Exposure Online, 38(2) Youth &
Society 135, 136 (Dec. 2006).
83. Consider recent bills attempting to regulate online social networks because of fears
about child predators and other sexual content, such as the Deleting Online Predators Act of 2006
(DOPA), which proposed to ban the use of social networking sites in public schools and libraries.
See, e.g., Sexual Exploitation of Children Over the Internet, Staff Report, Committee on Energy
and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, 109th Congress, January 2007.
84. Consider, for instance, Senator Byrd's remarks before the internet was even nearly as
socially pervasive that "[t]he political and social environment in which parents must today raise
their children is, unfortunately, an environment in which anything goes .... Profanity, vulgarity,
sex and violence are pervasive in television programming, in the movies, and in much of today's
books that pretend to pass for literature. The [n]ation is inexorably sinking toward the lowest
common denominator in its standards and values. Haven't we had enough?" See 144 CONG.
REC. S10,110 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1998) (statement of Sen. Byrd).
85. This includes the Dormant Commerce Clause and the Affectation Doctrine. See
Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (broadly interpreting the Commerce Clause to cover
intrastate activity that substantially affects interstate commerce an thus creating the Affectation
Doctrine); United States v. Jeronmo-Bautista, 425 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2005) (expanding the
scope of Congress's authority to cover intrastate crimes involving the internet, by applying the
Affectation Doctrine broadly to computer crimes). Note also that obscenity laws have not faced
the same problems, although the "community standards" element of obscenity, which is part of
most state statutes, is not the same in every geographical location.
86. See American Library Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding
unconstitutional, under the Commerce Clause, New York state law that criminalizes
dissemination of obscene sexual materials to minor using a computer communication system);
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the reins on regulating the internet to protect children, focusing its attention
initially upon the regulation of sexual content.
To address fears that children could easily access or be exposed to
controversial sexual content on the internet, in 1997, Congress passed the
Communications Decency Act ("CDA"), which barred both indecent and
patently offensive speech without defining either term. 7 Further, it did not
include an exception for speech with "literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value," as required to fall outside First Amendment protections.
Despite the statute's germane purpose in protecting children, the Court
struck it down as being overbroad in Reno v. ACL U.8 8 In 1998, Congress
passed the Child Online Privacy Protection Act ("COPPA"), which,
completely unrelated to pornography, prohibits the collection of personal
information from children under twelve without parental consent.89 Shortly
thereafter, Congress re-drafted the CDA to comport with the Court's
decision, renaming it the Child Online Protection Act ("COPA"). The
statute was held unconstitutional in ACLU v. Reno, because, in regulating
speech directed at or available to minors, it interfered with protected adult
speech.90 In 2000, Congress passed the Children's Internet Privacy Act
("CIPA"), which requires public libraries and schools that receive federal
funding to implement and enforce technology measures that block
obscenity, child pornography, and other material harmful to minors.91
CIPA did not face the same constitutional constraints, because the federal
government has more discretion to impose conditions on federal funding,
and it did not overburden protected adult speech.92 Unfortunately, because
much of the content Congress wanted to protect minors from accessing is
intertwined with protected adult speech, it has proven very difficult to
regulate internet communications, unless the content is outside the First
Amendment protection, such as regulations on child pornography. 93 Just as
People v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (upholding state law prohibiting the
dissemination of "harmful matter" to a minor "with the intent of seducing" the minor, because it
was sufficiently narrow to take it out of Commerce Clause).
87. See Communications Decency Act, formerly 47 U.S.C. § 223, et seq. (1994).
88. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 864 (1997).
89. See 15 U.S.C. § 6501-6505 (1998).
90. ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000).
91. See CIPA, 47 U.S.C.A. § 254(h). The statute also amended the Elementary and
Secondary School Act of 1965 to prohibit the use of federal funds to purchase computers of
internet use unless the school fully complied with CIPA regulations.
92. See United States v. American Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (upholding
CIPA because it does not induce public libraries to violate the Constitution, does not overly
burden adult speech and expression, and there is a substantial government interest in protecting
minors from accessing dangerous sexual content).
93. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 894 (1997) (striking down portion of the
Communications Decency Act, which prohibited users from using the interet to communicate
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frequently, however, courts recognized that further technological
advancements would not only enable a clearer understanding of the harms
associated with the internet, but also lead to statutes that could
constitutionally regulate internet content. 94 That said, it was not just the
rights of other individuals that were being implicated, it was also the rights
of parents to expose their children to, or children, themselves, to access,
certain content on the internet.
Presently, because much of children's activities on the internet involve
protected speech and expression, parents have broad authority to expose
their children to internet content.95 As noted above, courts upheld
regulations of areas in which the real world law applied clearly to the
digital realm, such as children's access to internet pornography. Other
areas, however, are much murkier, because the activity does not seem as
susceptible to real-world jurisprudential analogies. In many cases, the
perceived internet dangers to which children are subjected are not unlike
the quotidian dangers faced by children in the real world, both at present
and in generations past.96 Thus, before determining whether special types
of regulations are necessary on the internet and, if so, what kind, it is
important to clarify the difference between those harms that are truly
unique to the internet and those harms that are omnipresent, regardless of
whether they are dressed in digital form.
material deemed patently offensive to minors as encompassing too much protected adult speech);
Psinet v. Chapman, 167 F. Supp. 2d 878 (W.D. Va. 2001) (striking down Virginia statute
prohibiting the sale, rental, or loaning to juveniles of, inter alia, material that, taken as a whole, is
harmful to minors). Also consider the Child Pornography Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2256.
But, in the 2002 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition case, the Supreme Court struck down several
provisions of the law, which prohibited virtual images of child porn, as being overbroad. The
Court concluded that because current obscenity laws could capture any problematic "virtual child
porn," there was no need to carve out new prohibition.
94. See, e.g., Psinet, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 881.
95. See Eugene Volokh, Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody Speech Restrictions, 81
N.Y.U. L. REv. 631 (2006).
96. See Adam Thierer, Social Networking and Age Verification: Many Hard Questions; No
Easy Solutions, Progress of Point, 10-11 (March 2007). Note also that, according to a 2003
National Institute for Education Statistics survey, internet use among children from nursery
school through fifth grade steadily increases from approximately 23 percent to 50 percent . See
Rates of Computer and Internet Use by Children in Nursery School and Students in Kindergarten
Through Twelfth Grade: 2003, National Institute for Education Statistics, available at
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2005/20051 Il .pdf (June 2005). Internet use is only increasing, and
presently the numbers are likely much higher.
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III. Internet-Exacerbated Harms Versus
Internet-Created Harms
A. The Online Behavior of Children and Teenagers
Twenty-one million children, aged twelve to seventeen, use the
internet, which comprises eighty-seven percent of this age bracket.9 7 In
many ways, the internet is just another forum for kids to be kids-
everything they would already be doing in the school cafeterias,
playgrounds, malls, movie theatres, has simply taken a new stage. The
harms and the benefits are no different from those that existed before the
internet, such as socializing, gossiping, identity-development, bullying,
flirting, dating, and experimentation with sex, drugs, and alcohol.98 The
internet simply exacerbates them-elevating the behavior into a faster
paced, information-heavy, digital realm-without dramatically changing
them. Thus, our current parental rights jurisprudence applies with respect
to legal behavior and activities, and parents have wide discretion to
determine the extent to which they want to allow their child to use the
internet. 99 Further, regulations on children's broad internet activity would
likely run into First Amendment issues, as discussed above. Nevertheless,
some of the interet activity of children and teenagers poses a threat to their
reputations, which is an internet-created problem. This author contends
that the threat of reputational harm is sufficient to shift the balance of
authority from parents to the states in regulating children's internet
behavior without impermissibly impacting children's First Amendment
rights.
1. The Benefits of Children and Teenager's Internet Use
The sheer volume of information to which the internet exposes
individuals can lead to many benefits. Youth have the opportunity to
educate themselves about anything from academic pursuits, like a history
paper or college research, to more emotionally challenging issues, like
questions regarding sexuality and depression. Many emotional issues for
teenagers arise from the fact that they often have no one they can confide in
about the myriad changes occurring internally and externally. The internet,
OSNs in particular, provides a beneficial outlet for children to engage each
other and develop their identities.
97. See Fleming, supra note 82.
98. See Susan Kosse, MySpace is Also Their Space: Ideas for Keeping Children Safe from
Sexual Predators on Social Networking Sites, 11-16, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=989042
(July 25, 2007).
99. See supra Part I.
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Before a child even sets up a profile, she must think about how she
wants to present herself to the world, in selecting a profile name. The
process is as follows: Once she has a profile, she would encounter blank
"About Me," "Who I'd Like to Meet," "Interests," "Movies," "Music,"
"Television," "Books," and "Heroes" boxes to fill in the "Interests &
Personality" section.100 She can further define herself in the "Basic Info,"
"Background & Lifestyle," sections, indicating such things as her body
type (including height), educational background, religious beliefs,
relationship status, and plans for marriage and children.'' Of course, to
top off the massive informational divulgence, she can add albums of
pictures to her profile for either public or private viewing, after which she
could decorate her profile page with various backgrounds, music, and art.1
0 2
The multifarious steps to creating a profile can take hours, and that time
spent thinking about who she is as a person can be extraordinarily valuable
to her personal development.
Once the profile is created, the user is able to seek out like-minded
friends, both known and not yet known. By identifying herself with certain
interests-ranging from the band U2 or volleyball to sexual preference or
religious belief-she has already channeled herself into groups of
individuals who share similar interests. Sometimes it is very difficult for
children to acclimate to the complicated social terrain of schools, and
OSNs provide them with indispensable connections, so they do not feel
isolated. Further, for better or worse, because many OSNs are not heavily
monitored by parents, children feel safe experimenting with independence
and personal expression. 10 3  Finally, the anonymity of social networks
allows children the opportunity to escape the stereotypes and images with
which they may have been labeled in school or their community.
10 4
2. The Internet-Exacerbated Risks of Children and Teenager's Internet Use
Even the most vigilant parents have difficulty attempting to protect
their child from certain information, as other sources, such as the child's
peers, tabloids in the supermarket lines, and even the morning news are




103. See Kosse supra note 98.
104. Id.
105. This author would like to note that perhaps these obstacles explain why some educated
and digital-savvy parents are taking a luddite tack on child-rearing, by maintaining a television-
and computer-free household, and some grocery stores provide tabloid- and often candy-free
check-out aisles.
[31:2
PARENTAL RIGHTS IN MYSPACE
children is that everything is a new experience for them, and most parents
want to preserve challenging concepts and experiences-for instance,
regarding sex, drugs, divorce, war, and death-until they perceive their
child is "ready." As Alan Garfield points out, "[t]he notion that children
need to be sheltered from inappropriate speech long predates Janet
Jackson's 'wardrobe malfunction' or Bono's expletive-enhanced
acceptance of a Golden Globe. Plato expressed concern about youths'
impressionable minds 2300 years ago, stressing that the tales the 'young
first hear should be models of virtuous thoughts.'
10 6
The internet appears to present a greater challenge, because there is a
striking disconnect between parents and their children's understanding of
it.107 The average parent now began using the internet at youngest, when
they were in mid-adolescence, while their own children have been using it
since elementary school. So, the harms that children are facing on the
internet-access to inappropriate content, sexual predators, and
cyberbullying-seem new and more frightening when in fact, they are no
different from the risks current parents faced at the burger joints, roller
rinks, shopping malls, and video arcades of their childhood, over which
their own parents fretted.'0 8 As University of North Carolina journalism
professor Margaret Blanchard noted:
[P]arents and grandparents who lead the efforts today to cleanse
today's society seem to forget that they survived attacks on their
morals by different media when they were children. Each
generation's adults either lose faith in the ability of their young
people to do the same or they become convinced that the dangers
facing the new generation are much more substantial than the ones
they faced as children.
0 9
Although controversial content and other dangers may be easier to
access and more voluminous on the internet, few of the harms that arise out
106. Alan Garfield, Protecting Children From Speech, 57 FLA. L. REV. 565, 566 (2005).
107. See Thierer supra, note 96, at 10.
108. See id. Thierer notes that "today's grandparents will recall that when they were
teenagers in the 1950s and 1960s, their parents worried about their hanging out at burger joints
and roller rinks. And today's parents will remember that in the 1970s and 1980s, their parents
were concerned about their hanging around shopping malls and video arcades. Those places were
the social networking sites of their eras. And so it continues with the networking sites that
today's youngsters enjoy: digital, interactive, websites."
109. See Margaret A. Blanchard, The American Urge to Censor: Freedom of Expression
Versus the Desire to Sanitize Society-From Anthony Comstock to 2 Live Crew, 33 WM &
MARY L. REv. 741, 743 (1992).
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of children's internet use are much different than the risks current parents
faced as children. Parents may be just as prematurely compelled to explain
material they perceive to be age-inappropriate to their child as a result of
information gleaned from the internet as from schoolyard banter. Thus,
many of these harms fit squarely within our current First Amendment
jurisprudence regarding the regulation of controversial content for children,
because they either involve material protected or unencompassed by the
First Amendment, both of which the Supreme Court has addressed. 110
There is, however, at least one harm resulting from children's internet use
that does present a new risk.
B. The Unique Risk of Reputational Harm
Our children and teenagers' internet behavior is placing them at risk of
harming their reputations in a way that cannot be analogized to risks in the
non-digital world."' l  Unlike the harms discussed above-exposure to
controversial information, contact with sexual predators, and
cyberbullying-the internet creates, rather than exacerbates, the risk of
reputational harm. Reputation can be defined as "a shared, or collective,
perception about a person," often constructed by piecing together
fragments of information about that individual.1 2 It "is one of our most
cherished assets," as Professor Daniel Solove states, "[and] a key
dimension of our self [that] ... affects the very core of our identity." 113
Reputation, in many ways, makes our life valuable to others and our
accomplishments purposeful, which can affect our ability to create change,
succeed in our endeavors, and discover happiness. For better or worse, our
freedom to create our own identity, "depends in part upon how others in
society judge us. 114
When information is posted about someone on the internet, it has near
infinite distributional potential, both at present and long into the future.
115
110. See supra Part I.B.2.
11. See Daniel J. Solove, The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Reputation, and Privacy on the
Internet 37 (2007).
112. See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the
Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 691, 707-08 (1986).
113. See SOLOVE supra, note 111, at 30-3 1. Professor Solove cites from the Bible,
Shakespeare, presidents, and sociologists in asserting the importance of reputation to humans
throughout history.
114. Id.at3l.
115. It is very difficult to remove information from the internet-affirmative steps must be
taken to remove material in most cases. Further, even if an individual takes down his or her
information, it is difficult, if not impossible, to know whether anyone else has taken your
information and distributed it elsewhere. Frequently, not unlike Las Vegas antics, what is on the
The ease by which information can be posted on the internet can potentially
present a "haphazard" version of people's lives, including often
"incomplete, out of context, misleading, or simply wrong," fragments of
someone's life. 116  Further, the scope of information available on the
internet about an individual is relatively common knowledge.
Employers,1 17 higher education admission committees,118 family, friends,
and even complete strangers 1 9 troll the internet in search of others'
personal information. And, they are finding it. With adults, it is much
easier to take an "assumption of risk" approach, much more akin to a
Millsian approach to autonomy. 120 After all, adults are generally free to do
whatever they would like with their lives, so long as it is legal. But, this
phenomenon is of particular concern with respect to children and teenagers,
who, because of their youth and inexperience, often do not understand the
consequences of their actions.121
Very few commentators have focused on the much more serious
reputational harm-unique to the internet context-that a child could face
by putting their information on the internet at such a young age. 122 As
Professor Daniel Solove notes, "[w]e're heading toward a world where an
extensive trail of information fragments about us will be forever preserved
on the Internet, displayed instantly in a Google search. We will be forced
to live with a detailed record beginning with childhood that will stay with
us for life wherever we go, searchable and accessible from anywhere in the
world."'123  A less conspicuous harm than the sexual harms and
overexposure concerns many focus on, is allowing a child to
internet, stays on the internet, unless someone affirmatively does something about it. In fact,
there are special websites dedicated to ensuring material stays on the internet forever. The
Internet Archive makes it possible to archive sites forever on a program called The Wayback
Machine. See Internet Archive, Frequently Asked Questions, available at
www.internetarchive.org about/faqs.php#TheWaybackMachine (last visited April 6, 2008).
116. See Jennifer 8. Lee, Trying to Elude the Google Grasp, N.Y. Times, July 25, 2002.
117. See SOLOVE supra, note 111, at 38; see also Alan Finder, For Some, Online Persona
Undermines a R~sum , N.Y. Times, June 11, 2006 (noting that Microsoft officials admit to doing
informal background checks on prospective employees while other employers continuously
investigate their own employees).
118. See Brian Leiter, Top Law School Warns Students: Watch What You Post!, Sept. 1,
2005, available at http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2005/09/top-law-school_.html.
119. Recall the infamous Washingtonienne scandal, in which a blogger, Ana Marie Cox,
revealed the blog, which included the author's rather graphic sexual exploits, of the infamous
"Washingtonienne," Jessica Cutler, altering Cutler's reputation overnight. See SOLOVE supra,
note 11l, at 50-54.
120. See SOLOVE supra, note 111, at 196-97.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 17.
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permanently 124 display all the stages of their pre-teen through adult
development online, or even worse, foster the internet ossification of their
seventeen-year-old self. Most people have their secrets, awkward years,
childhood (even adulthood) indiscretions, and they will generally remain
concealed from college admissions staff, potential employers, or even your
future family. As noted above, in this new digital age, however, college
admissions staff and potential employers are actively scouring the internet
for the OSN profiles of their prospective students or employees. 125  Thus,
many children, in revealing personal information at a consequences-be-
damned stage of their life, despite the potential opportunities, 26 are running
a serious risk of stunting adult development, because their first impressions
to the world are out of their immediate control.
27
There are two issues involved in reputational harms: Harms imposed
on individuals by others and harms related to self-exposure. Harms
imposed on individuals would include such recent examples as posting
defamatory information, photos, or videos about other individuals without
their consent. 28  Self-exposure harms would include individuals posting
information, photos, and videos about themselves on their own personal
OSNs that may cause them harm in the future. The harms imposed on
individuals by others analogize more closely to many civil and criminal law
injuries that occur in the real world, like defamation, slander, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, fraud, and trespass. On the other hand,
there are very few civil and criminal injuries we impose on an individual
for harms inflicted upon herself.129 Even in the context of children, society,
124. See supra note 108.
125. See supra notes 120-124.
126. This author certainly recognizes the myriad benefits the internet provides children and
teenagers-educational, emotional, social, and informational. The solutions presented in this
article would not negatively impact the benefits gained from internet use.
127. It is very easy for individuals to transfer information from your personal control-for
instance, a photo or web posting can easily be saved to another person's hard drive or personal
website. Without technical sophistication, most individuals do not know how to protect their
information from distribution.
128. See, e.g., Juli S. Charkes, Cracking Down on the Cyberbully, THE NEW YORK TIMES,
March 30, 2008 (discussing Journal of Adolescent Health statistics on increasing number of
online harassment victims, which includes as many as 9 percent to 34 percent of adolescent
victims in a two-month period); Christopher Maag, When Bullies Turned Faceless, THE NEW
YORK TIMES, December 16, 2007 (discussing cyberbullying by posting insulting messages on
someone's OSN site).
129. There are laws prohibiting conduct that could harm individuals and laws that punish
individuals for harming themselves; however, it is generally in the context of conduct that the
state has criminalized. Examples include laws both prohibiting and punishing underage drinking,
drunk driving, and underage smoking. See supra notes 19-20 (sale of cigarettes and alcohol to
minors); see also D.C. CODE § 50-2201.05 (2001); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8004. (drunk
driving).
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in many instances, imposes the duty upon another individual. 130 That said,
our legal system, especially in the context of free speech and expression,
does not easily impose restrictions on individuals for potentially harming
herself by what she expresses.13'
Children and teens are posting potentially harmful information at an
alarming rate. An example of such information is the recent spat of
teenagers posting videos of themselves fighting each other on
YouTube.com and MySpace.com. 32  Eight Florida teenagers, aged
fourteen to eighteen, are currently being tried as adults, and could face life
in prison, for an assault on another teen.133 They fought the young girl in
retaliation for comments she had posted on the internet and planned to post
it on YouTube.com about them; however, a parent intercepted the video
before they could do sO.134 CNN.com posted the video on April 11, 2008,
in conjunction with an article about the occurrence, and it is very likely that
this video has already made its way across the internet through other third-
party websites. 135 Thus, regardless of what ultimately happens to these
teens, it is very likely that this fight will be immortalized on the internet.
Perhaps the most shocking thing to note about the attackers was their
reactions to being caught-one of them asked when she could go to
cheerleading practice and the other lamented, jokingly, that she probably
would not be able to go to the beach for spring break. 13 6 Another more
recent example involves a college student, age twenty, who, after being
charged for drunk driving in a crash that seriously injured a woman, posted
pictures of himself dressed as an inmate with the label "Jailbait" on his
Facebook profile page. 37 The prosecutors discovered the picture and used
it as evidence in his subsequent trial.
130. See supra notes 19-20 (duty imposed on vendors and adults for furnishing prohibited
substance to minor).
131. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
132. See Suspects in Video Beating Could Get Life in Prison, CNN.com, April 11, 2008,






137. See Unrepentant on Facebook? Expect Jail Time, CNN.com, available at
http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/07/18/facebook.evidence.ap/index.html, July 18th, 2008 (last
visited Aug. 11, 2008) (the article notes that many prosecutors are using such information to
increase sentencing for convicted criminals, as well).
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These teens are not uniquely cruel, they just have a skewed sense of
reality and consequences.' 38  In other words, they are just kids. As
psychologist Susan Lipkins noted, "[t]here is a disconnect between their
actions and their thoughts."'139 In some ways, this psychology is part of the
maturing process, and something that we, as a society, expect of teenagers
and children; however, in the internet context, such cavalier, exhibitionistic
behavior may have shocking consequences on these teenagers' lives, in a
way that is divorced from the present effect of the act. The cyberbullying
example is somewhat anomalous, because it should be far easier for a
teenager or child to comprehend the long-term consequences of illegal
action, like assault. It is more challenging, however, to understand how
posting seemingly innocuous content, like personal information, pictures,
videos, and messages that do not implicate illegal conduct could also affect
a minor's adult life. As discussed above, though, employers and
admissions committees are seeking out all information, more often based
on an individual's legal behavior. Even con artists are seeking children's
information online to falsify credit applications, often destroying a child's
credit unbeknownst to the child or parents until the child applies for a loan
or credit cards, often for college tuition.140 One can imagine how political
views, religious views, choice of dress, preference in social activities, and
just an offhand joke or comment could all affect a future employer's
perception of you. These elements of our identity evolve throughout our
life, but by the time an individual enters the workforce, for many people,
the evolution has stabilized. Unfortunately, we may not have control over
what remains on the internet, and frequently, our internet identities are like
Swiss cheese, with many holes throughout, lacking explanation and excuse.
As Professor Solove notes, there are several legal approaches to
reputational harms, in which the harm is imposed on another individual: the
libertarian approach, the authoritarian approach, and Solove's middle-
ground approach. a1  The libertarian approach is cautious about restricting
the free flow of information. Those that advocate this approach view the
internet as the "wild west," and believe the law should stay out.' 42
138. See supra note 133. (As a 2006 Justice Department report found, this phenomenon is
sadly not uncommon, by age seventeen, 21 percent of girls said they had assaulted someone with
the intent to cause serious harm.)
139. Id.
140. See Brigitte Yuelle, Stolen Innocence: Child Identity Theft, Bankrate.com, available at
http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Banking/FinancialPrivacy/StolenlnnocenceChildldentityTh
eft.aspx.
141. See SOLOVE, supra, note 111, at 110-116.
142. See Alfred C. Yen, Western Frontier or Feudal Society?: Metaphors and Perceptions of
Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1207 (2002).
Although this approach zealously protects free speech, it fails to protect
individuals' privacy rights. The authoritarian approach would control the
spread of information by banning the flow of problematic information.
1 43
This approach is appealing, because it seems clear-cut; however, as history
has shown us, standards defining what could be problematic information,
not unlike standards defining obscenity, are far from black and white. 144
Thus, this approach would likely run up against First Amendment
protections. 45 Solove offers a middle-ground approach in which the law
would help shape norms appropriate to the realities of cyberspace., 46 He
suggests that the law should act as a threat in the background, while in
actuality, problems would be worked out informally. 147 These approaches,
however, are better suited to addressing adults harming each other, than the
harms of adult and child self-exposure, as Solove himself implies.
The idea of protecting individuals against their own speech and
expression, frequently labeled paternalism, is not looked upon favorably.
48
As John Stuart Mill noted: "The only part of the conduct of anyone for
which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part
which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute.' 4 9
In fact, in many ways, our country's founders predicated our government
on the notion that the government cannot control individual's beliefs, even
if different than the majority. 5 ° Thus, historically, restricting speech and
expression as being harmful has required the clearest legal showing by the
government, which limits the smallest amount of protected speech.' 51 That
said, as noted above, in the context of children, these protections are
slightly more flexible.' 52  Consider Mill's autonomy principle regarding
children:
143. See SOLOVE, supra, note 11, at 112.
144. Id. at 113.
145. Consider, for example, a 1990s Georgia statute that banned sending data through a
computer that falsely identified oneself, which was struck down by a federal district court under
the First Amendment. See ACLUv. Miller, 997 F. Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
146. See SOLOVE supra, note 111, at 124 (suggesting the law should create incentives for
parties to use mediators and negotiators to resolve issues).
147. Id.
148. See SOLOVEsupra, note 11, at 197 n,15.
149. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 11 (Norton edition, David Spitz, ed. 1975).
150. See U.S. CONST., amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for redress
of grievances.")
151. See, e.g., Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-73 (1942).
152. See supra Part I.B.2.
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It is perhaps hardly necessary to say that this doctrine [of
autonomy] is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity
of their faculties. We are not speaking of children, of young
persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood
or womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being
taken care of by others, must be protected against their own actions
as well as against external injury."' 153
The reputational harms facing children are dramatic, far-reaching, and
at present, precariously inconspicuous. At risk of being overly simplistic,
there are two ways to view the current explosion of children posting their
personal information online. The first view suggests it is entirely possible
that the desire to indiscriminately post personal information is a
"manifestation of generational differences., 154 Perhaps the ease at which
children and teenagers post personal information for the world to see is
akin to evolving generational taboos such as females exposing more skin,
men staying at home to raise children, and pre-marriage cohabitation.
155
This view cautions against overregulation, because individuals are educated
about the risks and are not subject to the same injuries. If an individual is
aware that whatever she posts on the internet is permanent and will be
accessible to anyone at anytime in her life, she may actually desire such
candor and openness with the world. In that case, the same risk of harm
does not exist, because, she will rarely be surprised that the whole world
knows about her life, thus, she is less likely to get injured from disclosure.
The second view argues that that children and teenagers are simply
ignorant about the breadth of the internet and the harms to which they are
exposed. Legally, regardless of what the courts have concluded regarding
children's rights, there has always been an underlying notion that children
and teenagers are not the same as adults. 156  This view counsels for
153. See MILL, supra, note 150.
154. See SOLOVE supra, note 111, at 197.
155. See Anita Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM & MARY L. REV. 723, 737 (1999)
(discussing the notion of evolving norms that "[o]ur parents may appear on the television shows
of Oprah Winfrey or Jerry Springer to discuss incest, homosexuality, miscegenation, adultery,
transvestitism, and cruelty in the family. Our adopted children may go on television to be
reunited with their birth parents. Our law students may compete with their peers for a spot on the
MTV program The Real World, and a chance to live with television cameras for months on end
and be viewed by mass audiences.").
156. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, (while holding that children have the right to have an
abortion without parental consent, the Court still reminded us that minors "are not beyond the
protection of the Constitution" but that their constitutional rights "cannot be equated with those of
adults," because of three characteristics: their peculiar vulnerability, their inability to make
critical decisions in an informed, mature manner, and the importance of the parental role in child-
rearing).
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regulation to protect a generation of children from harms they will
invariably face in the future as they advance through school, jobs,
relationships, and life. Allowing children and teenagers to indiscriminately
post personal information on the internet could have the affect of freezing
their reputation prematurely, which will prevent them from developing
their desired identities as adults. Ultimately, limiting children and
teenagers' freedom now will give them more freedom in the long-run.
IV. Potential Solutions: Guarding Against Reputational Harms
and Preserving Parental and Children's
First Amendment Rights
Much of the harm children face on the internet does not differ from
those harms that have always worried parents and the government.
Protecting children from online predators can be easily analogized to the
"don't take candy from strangers" cautionary tales of yore, just as
cyberbullying to playground tussles and cafeteria gossip, and fears of
overexposure to regulations on violent and sexual content in print
magazines, film, and television. As the technology changes, in many cases,
the underlying risks remain, if only masquerading in cyber-costumes.
Thus, outside of the public school and child-harm contexts, parents should
have the discretion to choose to what extent they want to expose their child
to such risks. Nonetheless, there are new, unique to the internet risks, in
which parents should perhaps have less control. One such risk, as
discussed above, is the potential reputational harm children could face at
later stages in their lives, as a result of posting copious amounts of
information online.
I weigh two solutions that could effectively guard against the risks of
reputational harm without trammeling too much on parents' or children's
First Amendment rights to freely express themselves: education and
regulation.
A. Education
Technology-in the form of fences around pools, pool alarms, and
locks-can help protect children from drowning in swimming pools.
However, teaching a child to swim-and when to avoid pools-is a far
safer approach than relying on locks, fences, and alarms to prevent him or
her from drowning. Does this mean that parents should not buy fences,
alarms, or locks? Of course not, because they do provide some benefit.
But parents cannot rely exclusively on those devices to keep their children
safe from drowning, and most parents recognize that a child who knows
how to swim is less likely to be harmed than one who does not.
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Furthermore, teaching a child to swim and to exercise good judgment about
bodies of water to avoid has applicability and relevance far beyond
swimming pools-as any parent who takes a child to the beach can
testify.157
There is no substitute for education, as the above metaphor, presented
by a panel of experts studying how best to protect our children online,
demonstrates. 58 The more that individuals know, the better equipped they
are to guard against the potential risks and to maximize the benefits
available to them online. The societal push to regulate children's internet
activity is partly explained by adults' lack of understanding about the new
technology, which "ha[s] created a sort of 'moral panic."",159  Based on
parental rights law, it should first be the parents' responsibility to educate
themselves and in turn, teach their children about the risks and benefits of
posting personal information online; however, the state should support
parents in this increasingly more challenging endeavor. 60  A recent
example of a successful government effort in this area has been the
OnGuardOnline.gov website, which "provides practical tips from the
federal government and the technology industry to help you be on guard
against Internet fraud, secure your computer, and protect your personal
information."' 16' The federal government could also support the education
of parents by authorizing federal grants to support efforts to promote
internet safety conducted by qualifying entities such as schools, nonprofit
organizations, state and local governments, and businesses.' 62 States could
require schools to include media literacy and online safety courses at every
stage of education within the regular curriculum.
163
157. See Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council,
Youth, Pornography, and the Internet (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2002).
158. See Thierersupra, note 96, at 3.
159. See Wade Roush, The Moral Panic Over Social-Networking Sites, MIT Tech. R. (Aug.
7, 2006), available at www.technologyreview.com/read-article.aspx?id= 7266&ch=infotech.
160. See Kosse supra, note 98; see also Thierer supra, note 96.
161. See http://onguardonline.gov/index.html (six federal agencies collaborated to create the
website: the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Commerce, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, the Office of Justice Programs, and
the Department of Homeland Security).
162. See "Bean Introduces Legislation to Fight Child Predators and Combat Cyber-Crime,"
Office of Congresswoman Melissa Bean, Press Release, February 13, 2007, available at
www.house.gov/apps/list/press/iO8_bean/2132007_SAFERNETAct.html (introducing the
"Safeguarding American's Families by Enhancing and Reorganizing New and Efficient
Technologies Act of 2006").
163. See Elizabeth Thoman and Tessa Jolls, Literacy for the 21st Century: An Overview &
Orientation Guide to Media Literacy Education, Center for Media Literacy (2005), available at
www.medialit.org/reading-room/article540.html.
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There are few constitutional issues that educational initiatives could
viably generate. Certainly, some parents may not like the idea of their
children learning about such harms, but as the public school jurisprudence
discussed above indicates, parents have a limited role in curricular
decisions. Further, if education regarding such reputational harms raised
colorable religious claims, which give greater potency to parents in a
conflict between parents and the state, it is very likely that schools would
allow exemptions. As for children's First Amendment rights, it is difficult
to imagine an argument that educating children about the internet intrudes
upon their speech and expression freedoms. If anything, education actually
fosters freedom by giving children a more informed understanding of how
the internet could both inhibit and cultivate their speech. Education is
necessary but not sufficient to resolve the potential reputation harms facing
children on the internet. The benefits of education will be seen in the long-
run, but in the interim, it is necessary to take action to ensure the current
generation of juvenile posters is protected.
B. Regulations on Online Social Networks
Four different types of regulations on OSNs could reduce the danger of
reputations harms without overly intruding on children's First Amendment
freedoms: (1) temporal regulations on the information minors post on the
internet, (2) architectural limitations imposed on online social networks to
encourage privacy, (3) distribution and duplication limitations on the
material that minors post on the internet, and (4) stringent regulations on
the type of personal information a child can post.
As discussed above, the internet is largely controlled by the federal
government, so these regulations would have to originate in the
Congress. 164 Turning to the first regulation, Congress could mandate that
information posted by a minor under the age of eighteen be inherently
temporary, so that after a statutorily imposed duration, the information
would self-delete. Such a regulation should have a waiver provision in
which a parent could affirmatively permit the child to keep information on
the internet by signing a waiver provided by the OSN. The major objective
of this regulation would be to encourage minors to think about whether
they want their information to remain online in the same manner, and in the
event that they simply forget about what they have posted online, it would
disappear, so it would not affect them in the future. Temporal limitations
on minors' posted information do not intrude upon children's First
Amendment right to post information, because they have the ability to re-
post whenever they wish. But, given the harms described above, it does
164. See supra Part I.B.3.
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permissibly require children to think about what they are posting each time
they post it, such that the posted information will more accurately reflect
their evolving and maturing views. Further, in line with Ginsberg, it does
not intrude on parents' rights to allow their children to freely access the
internet, because the regulation does not control parents' decisions in any
manner. 165  If a parent does not want their child's information to be
constantly deleted, the regulation provides a waiver provision, which will
likewise encourage parents to consider the regulation's purpose and make
an informed decision about whether they want to allow their child to post
personal information online.
Second, Congress could require OSNs to alter their architecture to
reshape people's behavior on the internet with respect to privacy
protection. 166 OSNs can have the same power as physical architecture,
such as buildings to "affect the way we live and interact with our peers...
[by] encourage[ing] people to be more open, to communicate with each
other more frequently." 167 Similarly, the design choices of OSNs, like what
qualifies as the default choices, can dramatically affect individuals'
behavior. For instance, the default privacy setting on most OSNs is
completely public, such that anyone in the public can view one's profile. 168
Thus, a user must take affirmative steps to change the default settings, and
most do not. 69 Simply requiring that OSNs default settings be set to
private requires individuals to affirmatively think about whether they want
to expose themselves to the world, and that step alone, may help protect
many people. This regulation would not affect parents or children's First
Amendment rights, because all the choices-private versus public-are
still there, and there are no obstacles in the way of choosing to expose your
information except conscious consideration of one's choice.
Third, Congress could require OSNs to protect minors' information,
photos, and videos against archival functions, copying, saving, or
distributing by complete prohibition or notification when any of those
actions are taken on their information. Again, such a regulation would
have a waiver provision allowing the parent to allow the information to be
freely duplicated or distributed and waive the right to notification. This
measure is more paternalistic in that it does not require affirmative steps
from the user herself, rather the OSNs would be required to include
protective mechanisms. So, the benefit of informed risk in understanding
165. See Part I.B.1.
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one's exposure to the world, as with the architectural and temporal
regulations suggested above, is not present with this solution. But,
individuals are protected without intruding on their right to post personal
information. As with the temporal limitation, parents' rights are unaffected,
because the choice still remains for them to allow their child to
indiscriminately post information online in any way they want. Children's
First Amendment rights are more affected in the notification scenario,
because their parents are being notified when information has been
distributed or copied, which could potentially chill their speech. There
could, however, be limitations that allow the parents only to know when
information has been distributed or copied without knowing the content of
the information.
Finally, Congress could adopt more stringent measures aimed at
parental notification, in which OSNs would be required to distribute the
information about members under a certain age to the parents or guardians,
if under a certain age. This last suggestion seems like it could raise more
serious First Amendment issues in chilling speech, and this author suggests
that informal measures, such as education, could be more effective at
protecting children than statutory alienation. Another option along this
vein would be a complete prohibition on posting material on the internet;
however, this solution would be far too rigid and unnecessary.17°
C. The Constitution and Reputational Harms
Restrictions on children's use of the internet, whether directly or via
OSNs, raise potential First Amendment considerations. As noted in the
discussions supra in Part I.B.1 and I.B.2, the state's interest in protecting
children in a way that could potentially interfere with parental rights can be
loosely classified in two categories: Regulating conduct that posed a threat
of harm to the child and regulating exposure to material potentially
protected by the First Amendment. When it came to harm encompassed by
the state's police powers-such as abuse, 171 neglect, 172 or even sub rosa
concerns of truancy t73 --courts frequently held in favor of the state. On the
170. Some state Attorneys General, like Connecticut Attorney General, Richard Blumenthal,
have gone so far as suggesting a complete prohibition on OSN users under the age of sixteen or
eighteen. Draconian solutions, such as Blumenthal's, raise many First Amendment issues, as
noted in the above discussion and would not necessarily resolve the underlying issue. In an age
where age verification is years away from being feasible, rigid solutions are far less practical than
education or more focused regulations that do not intrude so far on our youngster's precious First
Amendment freedoms. See Thierer supra, note 96, at 3, 25.
171. See In the Interest of C.F., 708 N.W.2d 313.
172. See In re P. Children, 149 N.H. 129.
173. See Prince, 321 U.S. 158.
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other hand, when states regulated the type of speech and expression to
which a child could be exposed, whether as an active participant or
bystander, the Supreme Court required a clearer showing that the harm
outweighed First Amendment principles.174  Many of the harms arising
from children's internet use falls into one of these two broad categories, as
discussed above. Either the harm falls so far outside the First
Amendment-such as regulating children's access to obscenity and
protecting children from sexual predators. Or it is comfortably encom-
passed by the First Amendment-such as broad restrictions on posting
false information or distributing certain material to minors. Reputational
harms, however, pose a sui generis risk that requires a more nuanced
jurisprudential approach that is a balance between the deferential harm
standard taken in cases like Prince and the rigid stance of Turner.
Given the necessity to speculate on the risks of reputational injury,175
the Turner test would make it impossible for a regulation to pass muster,
because the harm would appear far too abstract.' 76 On the other hand, too
deferential a standard in the internet context is precarious, because there is
a slippery slope with respect to the First Amendment, and legislatures
would perhaps begin drafting broad laws to encompass far too much
conduct. 77 Further, although the risks of reputational harm are, indeed,
serious, the deferential standard should be used sparingly in the context of
more objective, clear-cut harm. Courts could view reputational harms as
sui generis, and apply a modified Turner test, which allows a less-direct
showing of harm, to allow regulations to protect children from reputational
harms that do not unreasonably intrude on their First Amendment rights.
Ultimately, the temporal, distributional, and architectural limitations
seem the most feasible when weighed against First Amendment values. As
the above discussion demonstrates, there is a serious risk of reputational
harm associated with children posting their personal information on the
internet, although the precise harm, by necessity, can only speculated upon.
Based on the modified Turner test, all three limitations would, in fact,
reduce the potential reputational harm, because there would either be less
information on the internet about the children, or children will have an
informed understanding of what is on the internet about them. Thus, the
174. See, e.g., Turner, 512 U.S. 622.
175. There is a speculative element to reputational harm, as we may not have an empirical
understanding of the risks to which children are exposed with respect to reputational harm until
this generation of child internet users have matured to their late-teens or early-twenties, as that is
when the information available on the internet could potentially impact their lives (e.g., applying
to institutions of higher education, jobs, relationships).
176. See Turner, 512 U.S. 622.
177. Note there is always the formidable check provided by judicial review.
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risk of reputational damage will be ameliorated, because future employers,
credit falsifiers, and admissions committees will not have the information,
or the children will know about, and presumably have approved, any
information such people do have.
V. Conclusion
Our current parental rights and First Amendment jurisprudence
addresses most of the concerns that we have about children and teenager's
internet use; however, reputational harm requires special, more nuanced
standards. The risk that children's present internet activity could
irreparably harm their reputations in the future is sufficiently weighty that
the government should step in as parens patriae to combat it and protect
our children's long-term freedom. To ensure our children and teenagers
have the opportunity to develop their identities without the internet
prematurely creating it for them, we must develop narrow regulations
bolstered by education-based initiatives to protect the young from long-
term consequences of their immature speech.
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